Hi Randy,
NOT our PWG IDS charter - it's fine.
The IETF NEA Charter requires that the NEA WG select exactly
one mandatory-to-implement transport. The IETF NEA answer to that
question is interesting to the PWG.
"The NEA WG will identify and specify the use of one mandatory
to implement PT protocol that is fully documented in an RFC."
http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/nea-charter.html
The IETF NEA answer to that question is interesting to the PWG.
The PWG IDS WG will write as many specific protocol bindings
as necessary, but a binding simply to NEA PB is useless for
interoperability certification by any real security lab anywhere.
Cheers,
- Ira
Ira McDonald (Musician / Software Architect)
Chair - Linux Foundation Open Printing WG
Blue Roof Music/High North Inc
email: blueroofmusic at gmail.com
winter:
579 Park Place Saline, MI 48176
734-944-0094
summer:
PO Box 221 Grand Marais, MI 49839
906-494-2434
On Thu, Mar 19, 2009 at 3:10 PM, Randy Turner <rturner at amalfisystems.com> wrote:
>> Hi Ira,
>> We can choose one particular "virtual" transport to mandate as a standard,
> but from a business requirement perspective, that probably won't do. I
> think vendors will adopt both EAP and DHCP as a way to transport attributes,
> at least initially. More may follow.
>> Also, if the IETF NEA working group doesn't feel "omniscient" enough to
> mandate only one method, how much "cache" does the PWG have in doing so?
>> We may want to review the charter again...
>> R.
>>> On Mar 19, 2009, at 12:03 PM, Ira McDonald wrote:
>>> Hi Randy,
>>>> Thanks for the details about the PT abstraction.
>>>> All - IETF PB-TNC *does* place specific requirements on the PT
>> on page 12 of draft-ietf-nea-pb-tnc-03.txt (6 March 2009):
>>>> 3.3. Layering on PT
>>>> PB-TNC batches are carried over protocol bindings of the PT protocol,
>> which provides the interaction between a Posture Transport Client and
>> a Posture Transport Server. PB-TNC counts on PT to provide a secure
>> transport. In particular, PT MUST support mutual authentication of
>> the Posture Transport Client and the Posture Transport Server,
>> confidentiality and integrity protection for PB-TNC batches, and
>> protection against replay attacks. PB-TNC is unaware of the
>> underlying transport protocols being used. PB-TNC operates directly
>> on PT; no further layer of PB-TNC is expected.
>>>> Randy - I don't care whether TCG ever answers the mandatory-to-implement
>> specific PT question - but the IETF NEA WG *MUST* do so in order to
>> fulfill
>> their charter - there's nothing in their charter about abstract will do.
>>>> Cheers,
>> - Ira
>>>> Ira McDonald (Musician / Software Architect)
>> Chair - Linux Foundation Open Printing WG
>> Blue Roof Music/High North Inc
>> email: blueroofmusic at gmail.com>> winter:
>> 579 Park Place Saline, MI 48176
>> 734-944-0094
>> summer:
>> PO Box 221 Grand Marais, MI 49839
>> 906-494-2434
>>>>>>>> On Thu, Mar 19, 2009 at 2:16 PM, Randy Turner <rturner at amalfisystems.com>
>> wrote:
>>>>>> Hi Ira,
>>>>>> The PT protocol was, from the outset, meant to be an abstraction, but it
>>> relates to the IF-T interface in the TCG TNC specs.
>>>>>> It's complicated, but the PT protocol is not one transport, but whatever
>>> "bootstrap" protocol is "in vogue" in the network community at any point
>>> in
>>> time, so it's intentionally left as an abstraction since it's difficult
>>> to
>>> choose and subsequently standardize "one" transport.
>>>>>> The TCG TNC group has published "binding" documents for tunneling TNC in
>>> EAP, and I believe Microsoft has published a way to deliver attributes
>>> with
>>> DHCP.
>>>>>> There may be other "layer 2.5" mechanisms produced in the future, which
>>> will
>>> naturally call for new binding documents, but the PA/PB protocols will
>>> only
>>> make "requirements" on these protocols and the core model (PB/PA)
>>> shouldn't
>>> have to change. Because of the sensitive nature of information in the
>>> PB/PA
>>> traffic, the major requirements would be integrity and some type of
>>> authentication, preferably mutual, but definitely client auth.
>>>>>> I personally think the tunneled EAP method (see IF-T) will be the most
>>> widely deployed enterprise/campus technique for delivering TNC messages.
>>> You
>>> can also google for EAP-TNC, which I think would bring up appropriate
>>> links.
>>>>>> Randy
>>>>>>>>> ----- Original Message ----- From: "Ira McDonald"
>>> <blueroofmusic at gmail.com>
>>> To: "Randy Turner" <rturner at amalfisystems.com>; "Ira McDonald"
>>> <blueroofmusic at gmail.com>; "Jerry Thrasher" <thrasher at lexmark.com>
>>> Cc: <ids at pwg.org>
>>> Sent: Thursday, March 19, 2009 10:45 AM
>>> Subject: Re: IDS> Minutes of TCG HCWG phone call
>>>>>>>>> Hi,
>>>>>> An observation about the extent of compatibility between IETF NEA and TCG
>>> TNC
>>> specs. The IETF (and presumably TCG) specs for PB-TNC (Posture Broker)
>>> and
>>> PA-TNC (Posture Attributes) *punt* security completely and say that's
>>> the problem
>>> of the PT (Posture Transport) component.
>>>>>> Although the IETF NEA charter says they will specify one 'mandatory to
>>> implement'
>>> transport, *nothing* in any published IETF NEA WG I-D ever does so.
>>>>>> PWG IDS can't write a binding to IETF NEA, because there's no transport,
>>> no
>>> authentication, no integrity, etc. Who knows what goes 'on the wire'?
>>>>>> Jerry and Randy - you guys have followed IETF NEA - is this magic
>>> secure transport
>>> sauce somewhere in IETF NEA WG minutes, or is it just not there to be
>>> found?
>>>>>> Cheers,
>>> - Ira
>>>>>> Ira McDonald (Musician / Software Architect)
>>> Chair - Linux Foundation Open Printing WG
>>> Blue Roof Music/High North Inc
>>> email: blueroofmusic at gmail.com>>> winter:
>>> 579 Park Place Saline, MI 48176
>>> 734-944-0094
>>> summer:
>>> PO Box 221 Grand Marais, MI 49839
>>> 906-494-2434
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Mar 19, 2009 at 1:22 PM, Randy Turner <rturner at amalfisystems.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>> Hi All,
>>>>>>>> After reading Brian's (and Lee's) minutes and notes from the TCG HCWG
>>>> call,
>>>> I had the following comments ....
>>>>>>>> I would agree that conforming to the NEA specifications provides most,
>>>> if
>>>> not all, of the benefits of TNC. I always thought that the TCG should
>>>> not
>>>> be creating protocols but instead, should be defining "profiles" of
>>>> existing
>>>> protocols for compliance with an overall architectural recommendation.
>>>> This
>>>> is similar to what the OATH consortium (OpenAuthentication) has done.
>>>> The
>>>> OATH consortium is a marketing/business/technical organization that
>>>> produces
>>>> IETF drafts for standardizing "on the wire" protocols, and the
>>>> consortium
>>>> drives adoption. In this way, they're employing existing organizations
>>>> that really know how to create protocol standards, and using the "paid"
>>>> organization to drive marketing/business, and technical evangelizing.
>>>>>>>> Regarding "Client-less" devices, Microsoft has defined a set of
>>>> behaviors
>>>> in
>>>> their NAP documents for how "clientless" devices are to be treated by
>>>> the
>>>> network. It seems to be that work on "clientless" devices is more
>>>> "policy-oriented" than "technically-oriented" and that "standardizing"
>>>> behavior in this area may seem more site-specific, and difficult to
>>>> mandate
>>>> a "global" conformance text for how to treat clientless devices. As
>>>> such,
>>>> I
>>>> think this may be something that could be "recommended" but not
>>>> "mandated".
>>>>>>>> Someone brought up the comment about remediation, and Steve Hanna
>>>> commented
>>>> that "relevant remediation instructions for HCDs would be worthwhile".
>>>> I think he's suggesting looking at a "standard" for HCDs regarding
>>>> remediation, which is a topic that came up on an earlier conference call
>>>> discussing a "common" NAP plugin for Microsoft's health assessment
>>>> architecture. No vendor on the call seemed to "leap in" and say we
>>>> should
>>>> do this.
>>>>>>>> I would urge participants in these discussions to think about Steve's
>>>> comments regarding the value of TNC/NEA protocols for devices WITHOUT
>>>> TPMs.
>>>> This may be a point of departure for devices that do and do not have a
>>>> TPM,
>>>> especially when/if the TCG starts defining formal certification
>>>> processes.
>>>> While a TPM may not be ABSOLUTELY required by the NEA/TNC specs, the
>>>> "bar"
>>>> may be set so high for certification (requirements) that a TPM, or the
>>>> equivalent of a TPM, may be the only way to hit the bar. It would be
>>>> interesting to see if the MS-NAP documents discuss
>>>> compliance/requirements
>>>> issues with regards to devices that DO NOT have a TPM. For instance,
>>>> over
>>>> time, will devices that DO NOT have a TPM be lumped into the
>>>> "clientless"
>>>> device category? Or basically, will there be a "third" category of
>>>> device
>>>> for devices that implement the TNC protocol but do not have a TPM?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Randy
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>