Hi Mike,
This seems like good news! That made me realize something: as a new usage context for PGP, we CAN require the most stringent level of security and not be worried about backward compatibility. In other words, we don't have to be grandfathering in all the old stuff in PGP - we can require the best set of encryption primitives currently available and baseline on that, and abandon all the older and weaker tech.
Smith
/**
Smith Kennedy
Wireless & Standards Architect - IPG-PPS
Standards - IEEE ISTO PWG / Bluetooth SIG / Wi-Fi Alliance / NFC Forum / USB-IF
Chair, IEEE ISTO Printer Working Group
HP Inc.
*/
> On Jun 4, 2018, at 5:01 AM, Michael Sweet <msweet at apple.com> wrote:
>> All,
>> The PGP folks have been discussing the EFAIL paper:
>>https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2018-May/060315.html>> In short, PGP has supported a "MDC" mode which is used to provide protection similar to GCM, and email clients are ignoring warnings (which IMHO should be hard PGP errors unless the user explicitly says to override the checks) and not validating multi-part MIME messages.
>> It *does* look like S/MIME is still compromised for the time being, but perhaps we can still move forward just using PGP (which was the original plan anyways...)
>> _________________________________________________________
> Michael Sweet, Senior Printing System Engineer
>> _______________________________________________
> ipp mailing list
>ipp at pwg.org>https://www.pwg.org/mailman/listinfo/ipp
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://www.pwg.org/pipermail/ipp/attachments/20180605/8b50f507/attachment.html>
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: smime.p7s
Type: application/pkcs7-signature
Size: 4241 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: <http://www.pwg.org/pipermail/ipp/attachments/20180605/8b50f507/attachment.p7s>