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At 01:17 PM 6/23/97 PDT, Cynthia Clark wrote:
>>hi carl-uno,
>>please excuse me for the delay as i've just
>returned here from a vacation.
>>these filenames are fine.
>>later
>>cynthia
>
Cynthia,
thanks, attached is the IPP Security document.
Regards,
Carl-Uno
Co-chair IETF WG for IPP
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INTERNET-DRAFT
Roger deBry
IBM Corporation
Jerry Hadsell
IBM Corporation
Daniel Manchala
Xerox Corporation
Xavier Riley
Xerox Corporation
John Wenn
Xerox Corporation
June 12, 1997
Internet Printing Protocol/1.0: Security
draft-ietf-ipp-security-00.txt
Status of this memo
This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working
documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its
areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also
distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. Internet-Drafts
are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be
updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time.
It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material
or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check
the "1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in the Internet-Drafts
Shadow Directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa), nic.nordu.net
(Europe),
munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim), ds.internic.net (US East Coast), or
ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast).
Abstract
This document is one of a set of documents which together
describe all aspects of a new Internet Printing Protocol (IPP).
IPP is an application level protocol that can be used for
distributed printing on the Internet. The protocol is heavily
influenced by the printing model introduced in the Document
Printing Application (ISO/IEC 10175 DPA) standard, which
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describes a distributed printing service. The full set of IPP
documents includes:
Internet Printing Protocol/1.0: Requirements
Internet Printing Protocol/1.0: Model and Semantics
Internet Printing Protocol/1.0: Security
Internet Printing Protocol/1.0: Protocol Specification
Internet Printing Protocol/1.0: Directory Schema
This documentis the `Internet Printing Protocol/1.0: Security'
document.
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Table of Contents
1.0 Introduction .........................................4
2.0 Security Threats and Attacks .........................4
2.1 Threats ...........................................5
2.2 Methods of Attack .................................5
3.0 Internet Printing ....................................6
3.1 Printer and Client in the Same Security Domain ....7
3.2 Printer and client in Different Security Domains ..7
3.3 Print-by-Reference ................................7
3.3.1 Unprotected Documents ........................8
3.3.2 Protected Documents ..........................8
3.4 Common Security Scenarios .........................8
3.4.1 No Security ..................................8
3.4.2 Message Protection During Transmission .......8
3.4.3 Client Authentication and Authorization ......9
3.4.4 Mutual Authentication, Authorization and Message
Protection ...................................9
4.0 Security Services ....................................9
5.0 Applying security to IPP operations .................10
5.1 Create-Job .......................................11
5.2 Send-Document ....................................11
5.3 Print-Job ........................................11
5.4 Cancel-Job .......................................11
5.5 Validate .........................................12
5.6 Get-Jobs .........................................12
5.7 Get-Attributes ...................................12
5.8 Print-URI ........................................12
5.9 Send-URI .........................................12
6.0 Comments on Existing Security Technologies ..........12
6.1 Recommended Security Mechanisms ..................14
7.0 Appendix - Specific Features of Various Technologies 15
7.1 S/MIME: (Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Ext.)..15
7.2 Transport Layer Security 1.0 (TLS) ...............15
7.3 SASL (Simple Authentication and Security Layer) ..16
7.4 Digest Access Authentication .....................17
8.0 References ..........................................20
9.0 Authors' Addresses ..................................21
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1.0 Introduction
The purpose of this document is to describe security
considerations for the Internet Printing Protocol (IPP). Internet
Printing is the application of Internet technology to network
printing. Using Internet technology, users want to be able to
locate printers, install and configure printer software, query
printers for capabilities and status, and submit and track print
jobs. The Internet Printing Protocol defines the network
interface for many of these functions.
It is required that the Internet Printing Protocol be able to
operate within a secure environment. Wherever possible, IPP ought
to make use of existing security protocols and services. IPP will
not invent new security features when the requirements described
in this document can be met by existing protocols and services.
Examples of such services include Transport Layer Security
(TLS)[draft-tls] and Digest Access Authentication [rfc2069]in
HTTP.
It is difficult to anticipate the security risks that might exist
in any given IPP environment. For example, if IPP is used within
a given corporation over a private network, the risks of
exposing print data may be low enough that the corporation will
choose not to use encryption on that data. However, if the
connection between the client and the Printer is over a public
network, the client may wish to protect the content of the
information during transmission through the network with
encryption.
Furthermore, the value of the information being printed may vary
from one use of the protocol to the next. Printing payroll
checks, for example, would have a different value than printing
public information from a file.
Since we cannot anticipate the security levels or the specific
threats that any given IPP print administrator may be concerned
with, IPP must be capable of operating with different security
mechanisms and security policies as required by the individual
installation. Security policies might vary from very strong, to
very weak, to none at all, and corresponding security mechanisms
will be required.
2.0 Security Threats and Attacks
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Before discussing security services specifically as they relate
to IPP, it will be useful to quickly discuss and categorize
security threats in a general way and discuss the means by which
these threats are carried out.
2.1 Threats
Security threats fall into the following broad categories:
Resource stealing: The unauthorized use of facilities, such as
printers, specific printer features, media, fonts, or logos etc.
resulting in some value to the perpetrator.
Vandalism: Similar to resource stealing, but usually without gain
to the perpetrator. Often results in denial of service to other
authorized users.
Leakage: The acquisition of information by unauthorized
interceptors during transmission.
Tampering: The interception and altering of information during
transmission.
2.2 Methods of Attack
The methods by which security violations can be perpetrated
depend upon obtaining access to existing communication channels
or establishing channels that masquerade as connections to a user
with some desired authority. These methods are:
Masquerading: Submission of print jobs or performing other IPP
operations using the identity and password of another user
without their authority, or by using an access token or
capability after the authorization to use it has expired.
Eavesdropping: Obtaining copies of documents and job instructions
without authority, either directly from the network or by
examining information that is inadequately protected in storage.
Document tampering: Intercepting documents or other print job
related information and altering their contents before passing
them on to the printer or print server.
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Replaying: Intercepting and storing print jobs or documents, and
have them submitted again later. Example: Stock Certificate
Printing. Protection against replaying requires the use of a
nonce and/or time stamp.
Spamming: Sending irrelevant or nonsensical print jobs or other
IPP operations to a printer or print server with the objective of
overloading the system and preventing legal users from getting
service.
Malicious Document Content Code: Sending documents that contain
malicious code which will bring the printer software into a loop
or even ruin hardware components in the print device. Example:
Using PostScript as a programming language to run the printer
into an infinite loop.
3.0 Internet Printing Environments
It is now important to understand how the threats and attacks we
have discussed above apply to the various environments in which
IPP will operate.
The IPP Model encapsulates the important elements required for
printing into three simple objects, the Printer, the Job, and the
Document. The Printer represents the functions associated with a
physical output device along with the spooling, scheduling, and
multiple output device management often associated with a print
server. An IPP client uses the IPP protocol to invoke operations
on IPP objects on other network nodes.
The initial security needs of IPP are derived from two primary
considerations. First, the printing environments described in
this document take into account the fact that the client, the
Printer, and the document to be printed may all exist in
different security domains. When objects are in different
security domains the requirements for authentication and message
protection are much stronger than when they are in the same
domain.
Secondly, the sensitivity and value of the content being printed
will vary. For example, a publicly available document does not
require the same level of privacy that a payroll document
requires. There are at least two parties that have an interest in
the value of the information being printed, the person asking to
have the information printed and the person who originated the
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information. This brings into the picture the need to worry about
copyrights and protection of the content.
Security attacks are now described for the following IPP
environments. Where examples are provided they should be
considered illustrative of the environment and not an exhaustive
set. Not all of these environments will necessarily be addressed
in initial implementations of IPP.
3.1 Client and Printer in the Same Security Domain
This environment is typical of internal networks where
traditional office workers print the output of personal
productivity applications on shared work-group printers, or where
batch applications print their output on large production
printers. Although the identity of the user may be trusted in
this environment, a user might want to protect the content of a
document against such attacks as eavesdropping, replaying or
tampering.
3.2 Client and Printer in Different Security Domains
Examples of this environment include printing a document created
by the client on a publicly available printer, such as at a
commercial print shop; or printing a document remotely on a
business partner's printer. This latter operation is functionally
equivalent to sending the document to the business partner as a
facsimile. Printing sensitive information on a Printer in a
different security domain requires strong security measures. In
this environment authentication of the printer is required as
well as protection against unauthorized use of print resources.
Since the document crosses security domains, protection against
eavesdropping and document tampering are also required. It will
also be important in this environment to protect Printers against
spamming and malicious document content code.
3.3 Print by Reference
When the document is not stored on the client, printing can be
done by reference. That is, the print request can contain a
reference, or pointer, to the document instead of the actual
document itself. If the client physically gets the document
before it prints it, then this defaults to one of the previous
cases.
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3.3.1 Unprotected Documents
In many cases, documents to be printed are literally available to
anyone. Documents, such as this Internet Draft which are stored
on anonymous FTP sites, are good examples of this. No security
mechanisms are required to protect access to these document.
3.3.2 Protected Documents
Clearly, there are cases where the nature of a document requires
that access to it be protected by some authentication and/or
authorization mechanism, or where the right to print the document
must be paid for. This would be the case for sensitive or
confidential information, or where documents are copyrighted or
sold for profit. Unauthorized access to content is a major
concern in this environment. Protection against eavesdropping,
document tampering and unauthorized access to the document are
also concerns if the content is sensitive.
3.4 Common Security Scenarios
As discussed earlier in this document,we cannot anticipate the
security levels or the specific threats that any given IPP print
administrator may be concerned with. Security policies might vary
from very strong, to very weak, to none at all, and corresponding
security mechanisms will be required. In this section we will
describe what we believe to be four common usage scenarios.
1) No security at all
2) Message protection during transmission
3) Client authentication and authorization
4) Mutual authentication, authorization, and message protection
3.4.1 No Security
If the server requires no authorization and the client wants no
message protection the client can send the print job, i.e., the
job content and the job attributes without invoking any security
mechanisms. The printer will print the job for the client. Print
by reference also works well in this environment as long no
security mechanisms are required to access the documents to be
printed.
3.4.2 Message Protection During Transmission
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There are two types of security that could be used to provide
message protection. These are channel security and object
security. In the first case, the transport medium must be made
secure by mutual authentication. Then everything between the
client and server is encrypted by the transport medium. The
transport medium can be either of the following: transport layer
security (TLS) or network layer security (IPSec).
In the case of object security, each object is encrypted and sent
over either a secure or an insecure channel. The recipient has
the corresponding key to decrypt the object and get the contents.
The most widely used object security mechanisms are S/MIME
[draft-smime], S-HTTP and PGP/MIME.
3.4.3 Client Authentication and Authorization
This scenario requires client authentication which may also be
used for authorization. A user ID and password may be used for
authorization purposes, and may be encrypted by the lower
security layer. S/MIME and TLS are good examples of this. TLS
supports both one sided and mutual authentication and can also be
used in this scenario.
3.4.4 Mutual Authentication, Authorization and Message Protection
This scenario requires mutual authentication and message
protection. TLS and Secure Sockets Layer version 3 (SSL3) are
good channel level security providers in this category.
4.0 Security Services
Now that we have decribed the security threats that exist in the
various environments in which IPP may operate, we will discuss
the security services that are generally available to counter
these threats. Security in general encompasses the software and
hardware functionality to deliver the following services:
Authorization: Only authorized users should be able to gain
access to systems, applications, data or services. Authorization
may be based on authenticated identity, location, time of day,
role, possession of a physical device or token, or other
criterion.
Authentication: Authentication is the process of proving who a
user or system is, and may apply to individual identities, roles,
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or groups. Authentication may be done with traditional methods
such as passwords or challenge-response mechansisms, or with
publicly recognized methods such as certificates.
Message Protection: Access control protects data when it is
within a secure system environment. However, when data must
travel outside of a secure system, such as across a public
network, it needs to be protected. Message protection includes
the following:
Data origin authentication guarantees that the data originates
from an identified source.
Privacy protection guarantees that the data cannot be observed
except by authorized parties.
Integrity protection guarantees that the data cannot be
undetectably modified except by authorized parties.
Non-repudiation protection guarantees that actions taken on data
cannot be denied by the subjects performing those actions.
Liability: Responsibility of the user for the printed content.
This holds the user accountable for making payments, usage of
special resources like transparencies, color printing, etc. The
printer is also responsible for the services performed and will
be held responsible for it.
Provability of Service: The printer should be able to prove that
it performed correctly according to the job attributes which the
client/user had indeed issued. Example: The printer should be
able to prove that the job request was indeed a monochrome when
the user claims it issued a color copy. Provability of service
requires non-repudiation.
Payment and Accounting System: The Printer should insure that the
wong person is not charged when someone issues a print request.
5.0 Applying Security to IPP Operations
An IPP client uses the IPP protocol to invoke operations on
remote Printer and Job objects. We now need to understand which
security services are required for the various IPP operations.
The IPP Operations are:
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Create-Job - Create an instance of a Job object
Send-Document - Append enclosed data to a Job object
Print-Job - Print the enclosed job, with attributes
Cancel-Job - Cancel a previously submitted print job
Validate - Validate attributes for a specific object
Get-Jobs - Return job queue information for a Printer object
Get-Attributes - Return attribute information for a Printer or
Job object
Print-URI - Print a document by reference
Send-URI - Append enclosed document reference to a Job object
Every time a new connection with a Printer Object or with a Job
Object is opened a new security context must established. An
administrator may set up different security requirements for
different operations, i.e. a user may be able to query a printer,
but not submit a job. Once a Job is created, the same (or
greater) level of security will be required to perform additional
operations on that job.
5.1 Create-Job
When creating a print job, authentication of the client and the
Printer are primary security considerations. Client
authentication, along with authorization, protects against
unauthorized use of print resources. Printer authentication
guarantees the identitity of the remote Printer.
5.2 Send-Document
When sending document content to the Printer, message protection
is the primary security service required.
5.3 Print-Job
PrintJob combines the functions of CreateJob and SendDocument,
therefore
authentication, authorization, and message protection are all
required.
5.4 Cancel-Job
Cancel-Job is only used to cancel a job. An end user may only be
allowed to cancel his or her own print jobs. Therefore
authentication is required to protection against unauthorized
cancellation of a job.
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5.5 Validate
Validate is used to validate the attributes of a remote object.
Administrators may choose to restrict the ability for certain end
users to see the attributes of a Printer, so authentication and
authorization are required services.
5.6 Get-Jobs
The level of security associated with the GetJobs operation
depends on the policy set by an administrator. One common policy
is for the complete job queue to be returned to anyone who asks.
This policy requires no security. For more secure Printers, a
common policy is to list details only on the print jobs owned by
the end user, while giving little or no details about other jobs.
This policy requires client authentication and authorization to
match the client to the print jobs.
5.7 Get-Attributes
An administrator should be able to establish the level of
security associated with getting the attributes of a printer.
5.8 Print-URI
Print-URI is like Print-Job except that only a reference to the
document to be printed is sent in the request. Thus the Printer
must fetch the document from the given URI in order to print the
job. In IPP version 1.0 we only allow unprotected (see section
3.3.1) documents to be printed by reference. Additional, as yet
undefined security mechanisms are required to print a protected
document by reference.
5.9 Send-URI
Send-URI is like send-Document except that only a reference to
the document to be printed is sent in the request. This operation
has the same security concerns as Print-URI.
Issue: Does asynchronous notification require any security?
6.0 Comments on existing security technologies
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TLS - Transport Layer Security: Seems OK, is near completion in
the IETF and existing SSL product are probably compliant, or can
be made compliant without much effort. TLS Provides channel level
security.
SSL 2 and SSL 3 - Secure Socket Layer: Proprietary solution
initially by Netscape, but TLS is very close. Provides channel
level security.
PGP/MIME - Pretty Good Privacy MIME variant: The original PGP is
widely deployed (but not much liked by the US government). The
PGP/MIME version is now being worked on but is still not out, not
yet stable, and not yet implemented and deployed. PGP/MIME
provides object level security.
S/MIME - Secure MIME: Currently a private implementation from
RSA. Although coming out as product from a number of vendors,
unlikely to make it on the IETF standards track unless RSA
decides to release their proprietary products as open standards.
S/MIME provides object level security.
SASL - Simple Authentication and Session Layer: This seems to be
winning mind share in the IETF, but is really only a security
feature negotiation protocol and does not provide any security
services in itself. Hence quite limited usefulness for IPP.
HTTP 1.1 Digest Access Authentication, RFC 2069: This provides
some limited security services, mainly only client side
authentication. It transmits a cryptographic digest derived from
the user name, password, and a server generated challenge.
SHTTP - Secure HTTP: Although on the IETF standards track, this
seems to lack some important features and does not seem to go
anywhere in the market place.
PEM - Privacy Enhanced Mail. Specified in IEF RFCs 1421-1424. It
was an early standard for securing email that specified a message
format and a hierarchy structure for certification authorities
(CAs).
MOSS - MIME Object Security Services. Offers the same
functionality as PEM, but does not force a single trust model,
and allows the identification of users by names that don't have
any relationship to X.500, such as E-mail addresses.
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IPSec - IP Security is an IETF standards track protocol for
security on the IP layer. It consists of two separate mechanisms.
The IP Authentication Header (AH) and the IP Encapsulating
Security Payload (ESP). They can be used together or separately.
The IP Authentication header provides integrity and
authentication of IP datagrams. The IP Encapsulating Security
Payload provides integrity, authentication and privacy. IPSec
allows for either host keys or user keys to be used in security.
IPSec can satisfy the IPP requirements for integrity and privacy.
IPP Authentication, however, would require both IPSec use user
keys and that the IPP application request use their own IPSec
security association. Both requirements are recommended by IPSec
but are not required.
6.1 Recommended Security Mechanisms
In order to provide security for the four common usage scenarios
defined earlier, we recommend that implementations provide the
following, which are suitable for use with HTTP 1.1.
- No Security - nothing is required
- Message Protection during transmission
- TLS
- IPSec
- Client authentication and authorization
- HTTP 1.1 Digest access authentication
- TLS
- Mutual authentication, authorization and message protection
- TLS
The security protocol used by a particular IPP operation will
depend upon the security services provided by the Printer and the
selection made by the client. This requires that the right
handshake messages be passed. These are described in more detail
in the Appendix.
Directory and Printer attributes are required so that an end user
can query the level of security supported, but these are yet to
be defined.
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7.0 Appendix - Specific Features of various technologies
7.1 S/MIME: (Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions)
Security services and features offered:
Sender Authentication is provided using digital signatures. The
recipient reads the sender's digital signature. Non-repudiation
of origin is also achieved using digital signatures.
Privacy (using encryption).
Integrity is achieved by using hashing to detect message
tampering.
Provides anonymity by using anonymous e-mailers and gateways. The
digital signature and the original message are placed in an
encrypted digital envelope.
Supports DES, Triple-DES, RC2.
X.509 digital certificates supported.
Supports PKCS #7(cryptographic message formatting, architecture
for certificate-based key management) and #10(message for
certification request).
Usage, implementation and interoperability:
Used to securely transmit e-mail messages in MIME format.
Public domain mailer RIPEM available.
RSA's toolkit TIPEM (Toolkit for Interoperable Privacy Enhanced
Messaging) can be used to build S/MIME clients. It includes C
object code for digital envelopes, digital signatures and digital
certificate operations.
Any two packages that implement S/MIME can communicate securely.
Compatible with IMAP (Internet Message Access Protocol - RFC
1730).
S/MIME works both on the Internet or any other e-mail
environment.
7.2 Transport Layer Security 1.0 (TLS)
TLS is a two layered protocol. The lower level TLS Record
Protocol that sits on top of TCP and the TLS Handshake Protocol.
The TLS Handshake protocol consists of a suite of three sub
protocols which are used to allow peers to agree upon security
parameters for the record layer, authenticate themselves,
instantiate negotiated security parameters, and report error
conditions to each other. TLS is application protocol
independent. It is based on SSL v3.
Security services and features offered:
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Privacy: (optional). Uses symmetric keys. Encryption done by the
TLS Record Protocol. The keys are generated for each connection
by the TLS Handshake Protocol.
Integrity: Using keyed MAC. Hash functions (SHA, MD5) are used
for MAC computations.
Authentication (Both one-sided and Mutual): The TLS Handshake
Protocol uses public key cryptography. Encryption algorithms are
negotiated.
Usage, implementation and interoperability:
Interoperability: Independent applications can be developed
utilizing TLS and successfully exchange cryptographic parameters
without knowledge of each others code. Cannot inter-operate with
SSL 3.0
Extensibility: New encryption methods can be incorporated as
necessary.
Efficiency: To reduce the number of sessions that need to be
established from scratch, TLS provides session caching scheme.
Other operations: Compression, fragmentation is done by the TLS
Record Protocol.
Handshake protocol steps:
Exchange hello messages to agree on algorithms, exchange random
values, and check for session resumption.
Exchange the necessary cryptographic parameters to allow the
client and server to agree on a premaster secret.
Exchange certificates and cryptographic information to allow the
client and server to authenticate themselves.
Generate a master secret from the premaster secret and exchanged
random values.
Provide security parameters to the record layer.
Allow the client and server to verify that their peer has
calculated the same security parameters and that the handshake
occurred without tampering by an attacker.
Note: The https protocol uses port 443 regardless of which
security protocol version (TLS, SSL2, SSL3) it is using.
Star (*) indicates optional messages.
7.3 SASL (Simple Authentication and Security Layer)
SASL provides a method for adding authentication support to
connection-based protocols. A command for identifying and
authenticating a user and for (optionally) negotiating a security
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layer for subsequent protocol interactions is included with a
protocol.
Security services and features offered:
(These are layers that SASL would call. One of these could be
selected.)
No security
Integrity
Privacy
Security mechanisms:
Kerberos
GSS-API
S/Key
Handshaking protocol:
1. Client sends data
2. Server returns success* with additional data (challenge).
Multiple authentication (s)* (Only one - the latest security
layer
exists during multiple authentication).
4. Registration procedures.*
Note: SASL is not relevant for HTTP based protocols, but could be
relevant to IPP, if IPP decides to later define an IPP specific
protocol.
7.4 Digest Access Authentication [rfc2069]
Digest Access Authentication is a proposed standard for weak
authentication in HTTP 1.1. It is intended as a replacement for
Basic Access Authentication found in HTTP 1.0. While Digest
authentication is on the weak end of the security spectrum, it is
a considerable improvement over the completely insecure Basic
authentication.
Security services and features offered:
a. Client Authentication is provided for by a client
username/password pair. A hash of the username/password (and
other information) is sent from the client to the server. How the
username/password is created is outside the protocol.
b. Integrity (optional) is provided for by a hash of the entity
body, username/password, selected entity headers (and other
information). This can be done on either messages from the
client or from the server.
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c. By default, the hash uses MD5. However, there are provisions
for other algorithms.
d. Digest authentication is vulnerable to replay attacks, man-
in-the-middle attacks, server spoofing, and attacks on the stored
password on the server. Well chosen implementations can
minimize, but not eliminate the vulnerability.
Usage, implementation and interoperability:
a. This is used by web servers and clients to pass
authentication information.
b. This is a proposed feature addition to HTTP 1.1. As such, it
is limited to HTTP 1.1 implementations (currently a small
number).
c. Different implementations have proven interoperable.
Handshake protocol steps:
a. Client asks for an access-protected object and an acceptable
Authorization header is not sent.
b. The Server responds with a "401 Unauthorized" status code,
and a WWW-Authenticate header. The header has the fields:
* realm - a string indicating the context for the
authorization
* domain [optional] - a list of URIs the authentication is
used for
* nonce - a data string used in authentication
* opaque [optional] - a data string supplied by the server
* stale [optional] - a flag indicating the previous effort
used a stale nonce
* algorithm [optional] - a token indicating the hash algorithm
to use
c. The Client then asks the User for the username/password (if
needed). It then calculates the needed information and retries
the request with a Authorization header. The header has the
fields:
* username - the string supplied by the user
* realm - the value supplied by the server
* nonce - the value supplied by the server
* uri - the URI requested
* response - the response hash (see below)
* digest [optional] - the digest hash (see below), used for
integrity checking
* algorithm [optional] - the algorithm used
* opaque - the value supplied by the server
d. If authorization is granted, the Server responds with result
of query,
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optionally including a AuthenticationInfo header. The header has
the fields:
* nextnonce [optional] - the nonce the client should use for
the next request
* digest [optional] - the digest hash (see below) used for
integrity checking.
Calculation of hashes
The response hash uses the values of username, realm, password,
nonce, HTTP method, and URI. It is calculated by:
response = Hash(Hash(A1) ":" nonce ":" Hash(A2))
A1 = username ":" realm ":" password
A2 = method ":" URI
The digest hash uses the values of username, realm, password,
nonce, HTTP method, date, URI, content-type, content-length,
content-encoding, last-modified, expires, and the entity body.
The values of content-type, content-length, content-encoding,
last-modified and expires are all taken from the HTTP headers,
and are blank if not defined. The digest hash can be sent.by
either the client or the server. The digest hash is calculated
by:
digest = Hash(Hash(A1) ":" nonce ":" method ":" date ":"
entity-info ":"Hash(entity-body))
entity-info = Hash(URI ":" content-type ":" content-length ":"
content-encoding ":" last-modified ":" expires)
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8.0 References:
[rfc2069] J. Franks, P. Hallam-Baker, J. Hostetler, P. Leach, A.
Luotonen, E. Sink, L. Stewart, _An Extension to HTTP: Digest
Access Authentication_, RFC-2069, Jan 1997.
[draft-smime] S. Dusse, _S/MIME Message Specification_, <draft-
dusse-mime-msg-spec-00.txt_, Sep. 1996.
[draft-sasl] J. Myers, _Simple Authentication and Security Layer
(SASL)_, <draft-myers-auth-sasl-11.txt>, April 1997.
[draft-tsl] T. Dierks, C. Allen, _The TLS Protocol_, <draft-ietf-
tls-protocol-03.txt>, March 24, 1997.
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9.0 Authors' Addresses
Roger deBry
HUC/003G
IBM Corporation
P.O. Box 1900
Boulder, CO 80301-9191
rdebry at us.ibm.com
Jerry Hadsell
1130
IBM Corporation
Rt. 100
Somers, N.Y. 10589
hadsell at us.ibm.com
Daniel Manchala
Xerox Corporation
701 Aviation Blvd.
El Segundo, CA 90245
manchala at cp10.es.xerox.com
Xavier Riley
Xerox Corporation
701 Aviation Blvd.
El Segundo, CA 90245
xriley at cp10.es.xerox.com
John Wenn
Xerox Corporation
701 Aviation Blvd.
El Segundo, CA 90245
jwenn at cp10.es.xerox.com
Other Contributors
Scott Isaacson, Novell
Carl-Uno Manros, Xerox
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--=====================_867305750==_
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Carl-Uno Manros
Principal Engineer - Advanced Printing Standards - Xerox Corporation
701 S. Aviation Blvd., El Segundo, CA, M/S: ESAE-231
Phone +1-310-333 8273, Fax +1-310-333 5514
Email: manros at cp10.es.xerox.com
--=====================_867305750==_--